



Lessons from Field Damage Assessments about Communication Networks Power Supply and Infrastructure Performance during Natural Disasters with a focus on Hurricane Sandy




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- **Introduction**
- **Wire-line communication networks**
- **Wireless communication networks**
- **Cable TV telephony**
- **Power grids and power alternatives**
- **Conclusion**
- **Additional details, information and analysis at:**
 - <http://users.ece.utexas.edu/~kwasinski/research.html>
 - <http://users.ece.utexas.edu/~kwasinski/1569715143> Kwasinski paper FCC-NR2013.pdf



- **Field damage assessments**

- They provide empirical data and records.
- Photos become evidence of issues and successes in a forensic process. If it is not in photo it may not have happened.
- Allow avoiding the “fog of restoration after a disaster”




- **Power supply during natural disasters**

- Power issues is one of the main causes of communication outages after natural disasters.
- E.g. Hurricane Katrina



• Power supply during natural disasters

- Correlation between power outages and communication outages is stronger in cases where there are insufficient number of onsite and deployable gensets.
- Due to energy storage at communication sites, communication outages lags power outages.



• Hurricane Sandy

- Flooding affected service in a few central offices.
- Most central offices did not present power issues



140 West St, NYC, 11/3/2012

• Flood mitigation strategies

- Placing all power infrastructure on higher floors.
- Structural concerns with batteries placed on higher floors can be addressed.

Lavallette, NJ, 11/2012



Onagawa, Japan, 4/2011

- **Flood mitigation strategies**

- Sandbags are not a very effective solution.
- Effective strategies include watertight doors and perimeter walls with floodgates.



Watertight door

Kamaishi, Japan, 4/2011



Unusomai, Japan, 4/2011

- **Flooding and power outages impact on copper cable facilities**

- Power and/or flooding may make cable pressurization equipment to fail.
- Without pressurized air multi-pair copper cables are damaged or have higher failure rates (even when they are filled with gels).



140 West St, NYC, 11/3/2012

- **Fiber-optics remote terminals (e.g. DLC RTs and FTTx)**

- They are used to restore service to damaged copper cables or central offices.
- Main advantage: planning flexibility amid uncertain demand
- Main disadvantage: Need for local power supply



Belle Chasse, LA,
after Isaac



New Orleans




Long Island, after Sandy



Algiers, LA after Isaac

- **Power supply to cell sites**

- Power supply for cell sites is a main outage cause during disasters.
- Site access coordination may make cells on rooftops more vulnerable to power outages



Ausbury Park, NJ
after Sandy



Rockaway Park, NY after Sandy

• Power supply to cell sites

- Power supply options:
 - Diesel gensets
 - Propane gensets
 - Fuel cells



Double Bayou, LA,
after Isaac

I-95 and I-195, NJ, after Sandy



New Orleans after Isaac

- **Power supply to distributed network elements**

- Observed approaches:
 - Natural gas pad-mounted generators
 - Camping gensets on pole mounted equipment (unsafe)

After Gustav



After Sandy



Chalmette, LA after Isaac



After Katrina

Near Yscloskey



After Isaac

- Communication networks are more distributed
- Concern: increased need for reliable power for customers' devices




Long Beach, NY, after Sandy




- Power grids performance during natural disasters

- Due to their predominately centralized control and power generation architectures, power grids are very fragile systems in which little damage may lead to extensive outages.




Power outage
incidence after Ike



Percentage of power grid damage
after Ike

- **Power grids performance during natural disasters.**
- **General observations exemplified with Hurricane Isaac:**
 - Severe damage is limited to relatively small areas.
 - Only one damaged pole among many undamaged causing most of the island to loose power.



Grand Isle, about 1 week after Isaac

Entergy Louisiana

- Proposed solutions for improved power supply
- Solutions domain:
 - Utility (e.g. mobile transformers, smart grids): limited effectiveness
 - Network operators (e.g. microgrids): may be more flexible
- Network operator solutions:
 - Microgrids
 - Standby systems





Fuel cell-based microgrid in Garden City, NY after Hurricane Sandy



Cell site with a standby diesel genset after Hurricane Ike


- **Network operators-based:
conventional standby power plants**

- Telecom power plants are needed in order to overcome grid's low availability
- Battery energy storage is essential in order to reach telecom-grade availability levels
- Power availability for air conditioners is below the minimum required in telecom applications





• Microgrids

- Microgrids are locally confined and independently controlled electric power grids in which a power distribution architecture integrates loads and distributed energy resources—i.e. local distributed generators and energy storage devices—which allow the microgrid to operate connected or isolated to a main grid.
- Combined heat and power absorption chillers help to address air conditioning low power supply availability.
- Microgrids have operated satisfactorily after Irene, Sandy and the 2011 earthquake in Japan



- **Key observation that leads to microgrid-based solutions:**
- During disasters damage distribution is inhomogeneous





- Solution: microgrids
- Lifelines and energy storage
- Most local generators depend on other infrastructures, called lifelines (e.g. natural gas distribution networks or roads) to receive energy
- But lifelines can be affected by the natural disaster like conventional grids.




- Approaches to address lifeline dependencies:
 - Diverse power source technologies
 - Local Energy Storage

- Solutions: microgrids
- Photovoltaic (PV) systems in microgrids
- Most renewable energy sources do not require lifelines, but.....
- PV systems have large footprints. Solution:
 - Size PV arrays for less of the required load and use it to support another power source rated at full capacity.
 - Reduce the size of the PV array and increase local energy storage capacity





- Solutions: microgrids
 - Photovoltaic (PV) systems in microgrids
-
- Most renewable energy sources do not require lifelines, but.....
 - Renewable energy sources have, typically, variable output. Solutions:
 - Local energy storage (e.g. batteries)
 - Source diversification



Kamaishi, Japan, 4/2011

- New approaches with integrated power and data/communications management
- They address issues with renewable energy sources by managing traffic or data management depending on available local power generation and energy storage resources. Photons transmitted through fiber optic cables are used as a “proxy” for electrons that, otherwise, would be circulating through transmission lines.



- Final thoughts

- Power grids are fragile systems and a main source of communication networks outages during natural disasters.
- Communication networks distributed network elements are more vulnerable to power issues during natural disasters than centralized network elements.
- Conventional standby power plants provide a more reliable power supply approach but issues still exist due to grid's very low availability.
- Microgrids may be a better solution than conventional approaches.



Thank you very much

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